| The idea
The true nature of dialogue
Dialogue, in its first meaning, could be defined as "a spoken or written conversation or talk" (Oxford Dictionary). But in a broader sense dialogue means every kind of reciprocal interaction between two or more persons. This meaning leads us to understand not only the effective extension of the word but also the dialogic attitude that must feature the relationship between two communicating people, either individuals or groups.
The word dialogue comes from the Greek term dialègein. In its verbal prefix dià it has the idea of separation, division and sharing but also the "conjunction of more subjects in an action having a recipro-cal influence." (L. SICHIROLLO, Dialettica, ISEDI, Milano 1973, 14). Probably Socrates was the first one to use this word to mean the "decision made up by many people gathering together to agree a shared statement by means of investigationn." (XENOPHONTIS, Memorie, IV, 5, 12). So both the verb and the substantive, in their original meaning, are difficult to translate properly into our modern languages or at least the common and ordinary sense we attribute to them is certainly reductive compared with their semantic richness.
From this short philological excursus we can deduce three fundamental features of the "dialogue":
- reciprocal interaction;
- agreement will;
- possibility of a final statement different from the starting position of both dialoguers.
The first item could appear unproblematic: it's almost obvious that dialogue must be reciprocal. Nevertheless that means that dialoguers must hold a dialogic attitude, not at all the "double monologue" that they often conduct. To dialogue doesn't mean only to speak but also, and above all, to listen.
The second one is more difficult because one must have the very will of performing an agreement. If this one (as one could suppose) isn't still present at the beginning a great wisdom to will it is necessary, i.e. that its sharing must be considered as a mandatory need.
The last one is most problematic because it involves the dialoguers's review of their ideas. Never-theless this must not imply any submissiveness covered by a sort of "pseudohumility": if the own idea is right it must be defended and promoted but because of its rightness not because it's the own one. Christian and secular ethics
The modern thought, from the Enlightenment on, operated a progressive spacing out between Chris-tian and secular souls of the society that output two different ethical systems, perfectly coherent into themselves, but at the same time opposed each other, very far from the universalism that the Middle Age and the following centuries have hardly reached.
The outspread of bioethical problems that profoundly involve the existence and the life-in-the-body of people has further increased that distance. Really, just in the Enlightenment cultural context, Kant formulated his theory on the "universability of moral judgments" as a previous requirement necessary to validate the ethical soundness of a proposition. So if an ethical judgement, in order to be correctly ar-gued, must be "universal", it is impossible any opposition between different ethics and also any relativ-ism that considers every ethical judgment good and right apart from its objective goodness and rightness.
Today this gap has been effective and became also to jeopardize because of the radicalism of each position. So we must strongly launch the ethical and bioethical dialogue as a great cultural project of the 3rd millennium.
Moreover even Catholics express a certain refusal, or at least discomfort, for a conflict that they con-sider artificial between Catholic and secular ethics because they believe that one must just speak about ethics without any other adjectivation. In that idea of ethics they identify all moral concepts of the Catholic tradition. All of this agrees with the above statement about the "universability" of ethical judg-ments; so if the evaluation is really an ethical one, it is such apart form its Catholic or secular origin.
In this way Catholic thought faces the secular one with a strong coherence. From one side it consid-ers that no adjectivation must shape the ethical orientation, from the other one it regards to own bioethi-cal view as perfectly conformable to the objective truth. That's why it must not be considered "Catholic" in a religious sense but in an etymological one, that is "universal". Its root, in this perspective, is not biblical Revelation but natural law that the Holy Scripture certainly includes but that is originally independent from it and knowable by everyone.
Secular world, from its part, could not have any problem to accept, in a dialectical facing, a Catholic bioethics but considers untenable that Catholic ethics could be the only one. As an author says: "The statement that theology has a role in bioethics leads to a dilemma: either medical and biological principles could be shared by every reasonable person (so we dont't need religion) or theology gives just one of many perspectives by which is possible to discuss moral problems. In this case there is no reason to prefere the religious one to other moral solution: so theology is either unnecessary or intrusive" (B. MITCHELL, Il ruolo della teologia nella bioetica, in: E. Schelp (ed.) "Teologia e bioetica", Ed. Dehoni-ane, Bologna 1989, p. 129).
Such a conceptual disagreement became a real ideological fight in legal debates (as in assisted re-production or organ transplantation laws) or in procedural ones (as in Bioethical Committees). The foundation
The dream of a shared ethics
We cannot shape any perspective of dialogue if we cannot solve a preliminary and fundamental problem, i.e. if we don't renounce to a strict "eteronomous" foundation of ethics. This problem is really complex and controversial. Generally we can say that ethics was eteronomously founded when it roots on some normative statements imposed by a moral authority in which it trusts. An old Latin expression said: iustum quia iussum that means "right because commanded". We sadly know how many historical degenerations this way involved (from Nazi to apartheid) but in its Catholic sense it means only a moral call-up on the basis of the Ten Commandments and the Church Magisterium. Of course there is no secu-lar people that should retain all this norms as universal and preceptive.
Nevertheless we must consider that when God orders not to kill or not to steal He doesn't command it because it's just "He" saying that, but He says that because it is right. He is only the authoritative source that shows us the objective rightness of a behaviour. In this perspective the Latin expression overturns: iussum quia iustum that is "commanded because right". On the basis of this universal right-ness (that all together must discover) the hope of a dialogue between the "two" ethics should be possible.
Of course this doesn't mean that a shared ethics is obvious or easy to reach. First of all because gen-erally we believe that values aren't objective and universal. We think that every culture, every people, every historical period has his own values. But this is a wrong understanding of the above concept. In fact every man or people or historical age looks better to a certain value instead of an other one. But the existence, the number, the kind of values is pre-existent to people's awareness of them. That's why we must discuss and search together in spite of discover the exact identity of every value for trusting in it and reaching it in every day life. However that is the common basis on which International Charter and Declarations are written.
The second problem deals with different anthropologies that underlie different ethics. This is a major problem because the specificity of a certain Weltanshauung is the first reason of difference ethical ways in problem solving. It is quite impossible to have a common and shared ethics while different anthro-pologies remain. The close relationship between them involve that a shared ethical view should be grounded on a shared anthropology and that, at least up to now, is quite impossible.
So the best way to face the problem is to declare, without any apologetic defence, the own ethical views and to build in the meanwhile a bridge to every other ethical position in order to find, first of all, the minimal ethical consent and, then, the horizon of a maximum ethical sharing. Specificity of Christian Ethics
The real specificity of Christian Ethics isn't the very "objects" of it (right to truth, to life, to truth, etc.) jet shared with many other ethics rather in the "form" of it, that is both the way of "living" it and in some inner radicalism (well expressed in the Sermon of the Mount). So we could say that Christian Ethics has four fundamental patterns.
1. It's a revealed ethics. Even if, as we above said, Christian ethics, as every other ethics, is grounded on the objective good of human being and on the following respect that he/she needs, the fun-damental ethical statements of it has been directly communicated by God. In the authoritative communi-cation of the Old Testament, God doesn't order any "new" rule neither discovers any new value but shows common values with the authoritative foreword: " I am your Lord" so -as we can say, f.i.- you shall not steal but not only because this is right (as also other people know) but also, and above all, be-cause "I" am saying so.
2. It's a dialogic ethics. In Christian Ethics the good that one does isn't only the fulfilment of a value but also an answer to a divine call. Ethical dynamics doesn't start, firstly, from man that acknowledges an action as right and consequently performs it, but from God that shows him/her the rightness of that action and asks him/her to do it. All the course of Christian existence is marked by this dialogue between a calling God and a man that is invited to answer Him. The sin is really the absent or at least the inadequate answer to this call, in a sort of disturbed dialogue. It must not be considered in the dark perspective of a God offended by a disobeying man but as a lover God that shows the way of life, freely refused by the man.
3. It's an eschatological ethics. Eschatology is the theological discipline dealing with the after-death existence. The perspective of an eternal (or better to say "immortal") life is fundamental in the understanding of Christian thought that is, first of all, the great announce of a happy life after death of which we can have experience. The "kingdom of heaven" is proclamed by Christ and every Christian ought to "build" it since his/her secular life but will be fulfilled only after death. One must be aware to consider this reality as a simple consolatory doctrine to keep at bay people. The perspective of another life is the greatest impulse to a strong engagement in transforming our world. Without the practice of justice and the respect of every human right the kindom of heaven remains absolutely inaccessible.
4. It's a love-grounded ethics. The great novelty of Christianity is the love for other, of "other" and every "other". No man is so far to be unlovable. Even, when Jesus shows who is "the neighbour" that one must love, he points to some of the most "far" people from Jews i.e. Samaritains.
Christians must love their neighbour "as him/herself" and some Jews commentators by interpreting "as" in a causative meaning, said "because he is yourself": there is no difference between you and every "other".
All this is not a simple exhortation or some advice for a way of perfection but it is the ordinary way of life of every Christian, not less mandatory than the Decalogue, even much more than it. In this very sense is really enlightening the Sermon on the mount in which Jesus says: you have learnt "you must not kill" but I say (that is "I order") also don't be angry; you listen "you shall hate your enemy" but I say: you shall love him (Cp. Mt 5, 21-48). The method
Toward a shared ethics
In the Vatican II Constitution Gaudium et Spes there is a passage that is the best introduction and, in the meanwhile, the best key to understand the following considerations: "In the faithfulness to their conscience, Christians join up with other people with the aim of searching truth and of solving, according to truth, many moral problems that rise not only in individual life but also in the society" (GS n. 16 b).
This concise statement shows all required elements to legitimate the sense, the extension and the limits of a dialogue between Christian and secular ethics. First of all the faithfulness to the conscience and the closer rule of moral act and as a guide, certainly a not infallible one, but that responsibly steers the person to reach valorial targets.
Secondly the joining up with other people, even better the "communion" with them, that the Latin root of the word shows, meaning rather the sharing of an engagement (cum munis) much more than the simple "union" (cum unio). Finally the honest search of truth and of solutions according to truth for in-dividual and social moral problems.
Nowadays Christian and not Christian people work and often also pray all together for peace, justice, ecology and so on, but they do quite nothing to find shared ways of ethical behaviour. The contemporary relativism leads them to respect each ethical view (and this is right) but also to consider them equally good. In this perspective any dialogical consent is impossible. If, f.i., we consider equally acceptable the suppression or the defence of the embryo's life we cannot reach any moral truth.
There is an interesting term of the Slav theology that is sobornost. It was first used by Alexej Chomjakov (1804-1860) to point up, as a distinguishing mark of Ortodox Church, the cooperation be-tween lay people and clerical hierarchy in faith, in cult and in life. In our modern languages we could translate it with the words such as "conciliarity" or "synodality" so keeping the Latin etymologic refer-ence to a common call (cum caleo - council) or the Greek one to a common path (syn odós - synod). Even if the word is now used in Ortodox Church as a specific mark of its identity, it could be well used also to explain the pattern of ethical dialogue that needs just this re-convocation by the Holy Spirit. Methodological perspectives
If we really believe in a possible dialogue we must find the most suitable way to plan out it and to fulfit its aims. On this purpose we can carry out some leading perspectives:
• The first one is the inner attitude from which a coherent and consequent behaviour must be fol-low. Without a firm belief in the absolute need of this ethical dialogue any effort of sharing would be just an academic exercise, something like a social mode but not more. Dialogue is im-possible without having a conversion and this latter, in its Greek origin, is metànoia, that means "changing of mind".
• We must agree that the sole moral standard of moral judgement must be charity as Jesus for-mally says (Cp. Mt 25, 34-40). Any other setting up, even if founded on the Decalogue should be just normative but lacking of soul. If eschatological judgment will be performed on the char-ity standard we cannot give any other ethical judgment but only a charity-founded one. So we must identify in charity not only the inner attitude but also the objective reaching of ethical value. In a right teleological consideration of ethics we must believe that it's "good" whatever better express and realize charity.
• But even if we accept this good attitude from both, Christian and secular ethics, we must still face to the problem of the "building" or better to say of the "discovery" of a common ethics. In this perspective we cannot forget what the Vatican II said about "hierarchy of truths": "while one compare different doctrines one must remember that there is an order or "hierarchy" in truths of Catholic doctrines because their relation with the foundation of Christian faith is different" (Unitatis Redintegratio, 11c). If this hierarchy exists for faith truths, even more for moral ones that are much less dogmatic.
• Just for that we must find a priority choice, fit to become the fundamental standard of the whole ethical system, an inspiring principle of an unitary bioethical model. This all-inclusive criterion should be the human person and the consequent personalistic ethics. If, up to now, we have spoken about "values", human person is "the" value that abridge and get over them. That is the human individual in his/her physical, rational, social identity, with his/her biologic life, free-dom, desire to live in harmony with him/herself and any other people.
• Finally we must found, as the pope John 23rd said, "all that joins up rather then separates us". It would be impossible the achievement of a common and shared ethics if we point out first of all to settle our differences. We must rather have experience of communion and reciprocal appre-ciation. If we could translate all that into a mathematical formula we should say that we don't have to reassemble the unity by the summa of different parts but we must reach the infinite as the summa of different units. Conclusion
It's all really possible, or it's one more utopia ? Probably someone thinks that these are just good words. That's right: these are only words. But every fact exists first of all as an idea, then as simply words and only finally as a fact. So, if we extinguish the word we extinguish also the fact that comes from it.
In this matter we have a very enlightening biblical teaching that is the passage from Babel to Pentecost. Babel was the confusion of languages, the stress of every difference, the greatest recipro-cal incommunicability. Pentecost is the healing of this communication wound, but not by eliminating diversities or flattening languages, rather making them understanding each other: "everyone heard the apostles speaking in their own language" (At 2,6).
From the Holy Scripture we can carry out two other interesting teachings. The first one is that we all are a "community in one's way". Most of us are lay people and also priests are born lays in their baptism, so we are "people" as the Greek etymology points out (laos = people). The way of salvation is never an individual but a community one, even if the response is always personal. So we should feel the sadness of a lonely salvation.
In a second place the above path reminds us the wait for our destination. Just for that we should foresee that probably we cannot reach it but only see it from far as Moses from the Nebo mount. Not only reminding this fact, but also looking it going away just when we think to have reached it. But this is the very nature of every horizon, even the hope one. The finishing line is never reached: it's always later on. That's why we must never be satisfied of the result and we must work much more for a higher one. Every ideal is always "further one".
So, let us pray the Holy Spirit for giving us the skill of realizing all of this, but always with the awareness that any result shall be His work, not ours. |
